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THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A PROBLEM 
René Bekkers 
21 February 2000 
 
In an otherwise useless book, Deutscher (1973) employed the distinction between the logic of a 
problem as portrayed in scientific publications and the autobiographical 'logic' of its discovery and 
treatment. The distinction is familiar to any social scientist. The way we present our results is seldom 
the same as the path we followed to reach them. Following current conventions in social science, I 
wrote the articles in my dissertation as a series of questions, that seemed worthy of giving attention 
given the state of the knowledge available in the literature. I tried to make progress where substantial 
gaps were obvious and my capacities allowed me to. But how did I get to my account of 'the current 





Looking back on the development of my 
PhD-project, I can see a continuous line of 
development since the beginning of my education 
as a sociologist. I studied sociology at Nijmegen 
University, The Netherlands. Although the 
Institute was officially of Catholic signature, its 
ecclesiastical undertones were hardly visible to 
me. The kind of sociology I was taught was 
mainly empirical macro-sociology. Questions on 
stratification and mobility, racial attitudes, 
voting, homogeneity of marriages inspired most 
of the research going on at the time. The catholic 
origins of the Institute were only visible in 
repeated, cross-sectional surveys measuring 
values, attitudes and their behavioral correlates 
such as voting and religious denomination. In line 
with my interest in philosophical questions on 
scientific methods, religious beliefs and even 
metaphysics, I wrote a master thesis on the beliefs 
of clients of a 'New Age'-center - which was quite 
a new phenomenon at the time (Bekkers, 1997). 
 
 
A Different World 
 
After my graduation I found a PhD-
position at the Interuniversity Center for Social 
Science Theory and Methodology (ICS), Utrecht 
University. The project consisted of half a page of 
ideas on the sociology of consumption (ICS, 
1997), and was supervised by Harry Ganzeboom, 
a former teacher from my first year of sociology 
in Nijmegen, and Nan Dirk de Graaf, who had 
been a lecturer in Nijmegen all along. In essence, 
the aim was to identify a new pattern of 
consumption, associated with a post-materialist 
value orientation (Inglehart, 1977). The project 
had some connections with my master thesis, 
because 'New Age'-clients were high in post-
materialism. But this was not the direction that I 
followed. As I entered the ICS, I discovered that 
the research school, of which my sociology-
teachers were members, was based on a 
combination of rational choice theory and 
Popperian methodology. I knew Popper's 
philosophy of science and was very sympathetic 
to it, but with rational choice theory I was rather 
unfamiliar. At the ICS I learned the principles of 
rational choice theory. My first serious meeting 
with it was unsettling, because I thought that 
cynical assumptions on human nature were 
central to its explanatory power. Although I 
didn't like the assumption of material self-
interest, I tried to work with it. But I also came 
to see its shortcomings. According to a simple 
version of rational choice theory, rational actors 
in social dilemmas should not contribute to public 
goods. Because I saw the consumption of 
'environment-friendly' products as a part of the 
post-materialist lifestyle, I tried to explain this 
phenomenon with reference to self-interest only. 
At first, this was an intellectual problem. Many 
rational choice-theorists I read apparently saw it 
as a challenge to explain away 'seemingly' 
altruistic acts as the ultimate result of self-
interest. But many experiments show that people 
do cooperate, even in 'one shot'-dilemmas, which 
are specifically structured to induce ‘rational’, 
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selfish behavior. How could this be possible? 
Then the question caught me: why do people do 
things that are no good for themselves anyway?  
 
After I had got acquainted with the 
‘participation paradox’ in theory, I discovered 
more and more examples of unselfish behavior in 
real life. There were even much stronger 
examples in real life than in the world of 
experimental gaming: donation of money to 
charity, donation of bodily organs, donation of 
blood, and so on. These examples made my 
questions on the participation paradox even more 
urgent. From personal experience I got the 
suspicion that there had to be important 
individual differences in altruism. Maybe the 
steady percentage of people that keep on playing 




From 'Cooperation' to 'Prosocial 
Behavior' 
 
At this point, the project took a decisive 
turn. The central idea of the project shifted from 
the identification of a post-materialist lifestyle to 
the explanation of 'altruistic' behaviors such as 
buying environmentally friendly products. It was 
one of my supervisors, Harry Ganzeboom, who 
suggested that I take a look into social 
psychology. He remembered the term 'prosocial 
behavior' as precisely the category of behaviors 
that I was interested in. A blind search in the 
library formed the basis of all the work I did from 
that point onwards. As a kind of naïve 
mountaineer I started reading the literature. I 
didn't know that so much work had already been 
done, and I was also unfamiliar with social 
psychology altogether. I did not only read 
substantive papers, but also dived into 
methodological issues such as the debate on 
consistency from the seventies.  
 
I made some important discoveries that 
were surprising for a sociologist with an interest 
in questions on philosophy of science. I 
discovered that there are large differences in 
method and theory between social psychological 
studies, game theoretical approaches and 
sociological treatments of the subject. The 
substantive papers gave me an enormous list of 
independent variables to consider in an 
explanatory model, including personality 
characteristics. To many sociologists, personality 
is non-existent, or - at best - not relevant (read: 
not interesting). In the meantime, I sharpened my 
dependent variable, because I discovered that the 
term 'prosocial behavior' was too broad to deal 
with in unity. I discovered that I was interested in 
understanding how prosocial behavior in the 
absence of clearly material interests for the 
beneficiary him/herself came about. I selected 
dependent variables where situational factors 
cannot fully explain prosocial behavior, because 
they lack the altruistic motive: to make the other 
better off. When situational factors cannot do the 
job, we have to look on the person-side. I 
concluded that there must be something in the 
heads of people playing these prisoner's dilemma 
games that makes them cooperate, even when the 
situation is specifically designed to make them 
defect. From the social psychological literature I 
learned that there were indeed important 
individual differences in game behavior. As an 
explanation, the obvious candidate in personality 
was some individual difference in altruism. The 
rational choice perspective I had become familiar 
with, made me think of altruism as having a 
preference for outcomes of other players. At first 
it was the Margolis (1982)-model that fit into this 
picture. Reading his book, however, I wondered 
how people decide (or: how it is determined) 
whether they value outcomes for others. The 
concept of social orientations that I met in the 
work of Liebrand and Van Lange appealed very 
much to me, because this model was more clear 
and simple.  
 
However, sociologists are not very fond 
of introducing individual differences out of the 
blue. My supervisors kept asking me why these 
'social orientations' were so important. I had no 
real answer at that time, but I came back to the 
question later on. In the meantime, I had become 
acquainted with the concept of empathy through 
the experimental work of Daniel Batson (1991). I 
didn’t like his general question (“Does real 
altruism exist?”) and I also didn’t like his 
situational interpretation of empathy. But the 
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concept of empathy in itself stroke me as an 
important clarification of the simple idea of 
altruism inherent in social orientations. Empathy 
seemed to be an interpretation of why people 
care for others. Looking for an individual 
difference measure of empathy, which I found in 
the work of Mark Davis (1994), I also came 
across a series of articles by Nancy Eisenberg 
(Eisenberg, 1982; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; 
Eisenberg et al., 1989; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1994). 
As a developmental psychologist, she had also 
been active in the field of socialization and 
parenting. This research opened up a new 
perspective on the old question of my supervisors 
why social orientations were so important. I 
reasoned that parenting styles are not randomly 
distributed among the population, which implies 
that conventional sociological variables such as 
education, income, and social status had to be of 
importance for individual differences in prosocial 
dispositions. It was also probably through her 
work that I discovered that a strong debate had 
been going on in social psychology in the late 
1970s and early 1980s between supporters of 
dispositional and situational explanations of social 
behavior: the 'consistency controversy'. Here I 
found another enormous amount of material, that 
needed delimitation in order not to get lost. I felt 
that the ‘interactionist’ perspective that emerged 
from the consistency debate could be an 
important candidate to integrate the different 
perspectives of social psychology, sociology, and 
rational choice theory.  
 
 
Selling the Project: What's New? 
 
The next step was the formulation of a 
research problem that contained new elements. 
While I was getting to know the literature, I had 
mainly been interested in what had been 
discovered previously, and not so much in what 
had not been dealt with. Repeating what others 
have done before you creates clarity and order, 
but is not very useful to get your PhD-project 
funded. I had to come up with some strong points 
on which I could improve upon the existing body 
of research. I identified conceptual problems: 
prosocial behavior is often considered to be one 
single category of behavior, while this is not the 
case. I saw some awareness of this problem 
glimmering between the lines, but not a full 
realization of it. That's why I took a fresh look at 
the literature that I had been dealing with for so 
long, with a new question in mind: how can I 
distinguish between different kinds of prosocial 
behavior to understand why so many variables are 
connected with it, and why they have different 
kinds effects in different studies? I divided the 
unified category of prosocial behavior in different 
dimensions, and used insights from the 
consistency debate to understand differential 
effects of person-and situation-variables. Et voila: 
research question 1 & 2.  
 
My third research question emerged 
from an imaginary discussion I held between a 
sociologist and a social psychologist. The 
sociologist asks: 'Why are individual differences 
important? They may add some explained 
variance to your regression model, but they do 
not alter the effects of other independent 
variables.' The social psychologist started talking 
about interaction-effects, but was interrupted by 
the sociologist with the argument that inclusion 
of interaction-effects does not necessarily change 
the magnitude of main effects. Then a pair of new 
discussion partners entered the arena: the 
classical sociologist, and the developmental 
psychologist. The former asked the rational 
choice theorist: 'Do you really think that 
individual differences in altruism are normally 
distributed among the population?' The 
developmental psychologist added: 'Of course 
not. Since we took over socialization research 
from sociology, we have discovered much of the 
origins of prosocial dispositions.' The classical 
sociologist corrected this view: 'But you 
neglected many of the truly sociological 
variables…' This imaginary discussion was the 
beginning of my third research question, which I 
developed more and more later on.  
 
Of course, there was the occasional 
disappointment during my exploration that 
others had already published my 'revolutionary' 
ideas years before I came to think of them and 
wrote them down. An example is the idea to 
divide prosocial behavior into theoretically 
meaningful categories of behavior, in order to 
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predict differential personality effects on helping. 
I put the idea in my NWO-proposal (submitted 
in may 1998), but found it back in January, 2000, 
in Staub's extensive volume (1978, vol. 1, p. 
122-123) when ploughing through the pile of 
literature that was simply too much when writing 
the proposal. 
 
Another example was the vignette-part of 
the study. When tracing the literature on person-
situation-interactions in January, 1999, I 
recognized the idea to test interaction-effects 
with hypothetical scenarios that I put in the 
NWO-proposal in may 1998 in Carlo et al. 
(1991). And they were already late, since I found 
out in January 2000 that the very same idea is 
presented in the discussion of a taxonomy of 
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